BOOK REVIEW
LAW, LAWYERS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE. By HaroldHorowitz and
Kenneth Karst. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969. Pp. 531.

Law, Lawyers, and Social Change' is the rather ambitious title of
a new law school casebook for a course in what is commonly called
"legal process." To the extent casebooks can determine course
coverage, legal process courses traditionally have focused on matters
such as the judicial function, including development of the common
law, interpretation of statutes, the writing of opinions, and
prospective overruling; the legislative function, including enactment
procedure; and, perhaps, something on the nature of law. A survey of
the books in this field indicates that the authors of the legal process
texts usually feel called upon to offer an explanation for the
publication of a separate book on the legal process, 2 and the present
authors are no exception.3 Such explanations are perhaps a response
to the oft-made assertion that any law school course properly taught
is a course, at least in part, on the legal process, therefore precluding
the necessity for separate treatment of legal process topics.
A separate course in legal process could be justified on several
grounds. First, one might argue that a separate course is a more
efficient allocation of instructional time and allows the other teachers
to concentrate on the substance of their courses. A related argument is
that a separate course is institutionally necessary to insure that certain
issues will be discussed in the curriculum. Third, and perhaps more
fundamental, one may urge that separate treatment is pedagogically
required, because mastery of these subjects can only be achieved if
they are studied in depth through material which draws from a large
number of traditional doctrinal classifications. Horowitz and Karst,
professors of law at the University of California at Los Angeles, offer
the following explanation for their legal process book:
Every course in law school is a course in the legal process, reflecting the entire
legal system as it comes to bear on a single subject area. Most courses,
however, emphasize the development of the legal doctrine that governs their
1. H. HoRowITz & K.

KARST, LAW, LAWYERS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

(1968) [hereinafter

cited as HORowrrz & KARST].
2. E.g., W. FRYER & H. ORENTLICHER, LEGAL METHOD AND LEGAL SYSTEM ix (1967); B.
GAvrr, R. FUCHS & M. PAULSEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS iii (1952); P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 3 (1965).
3. HOROWITZ & KARST I.
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fields, and not the institutional process that produces the doctrine. .
focus is institutional, not doctrinal. .... I

.

. Our

The authors seek to explore no new ground in the legal process
issues they raise. Indeed, in this respect their venture is traditional.'
The "introduction to an introduction" outlines five areas of inquiry
which provide a standard legal process menu: the role of courts in
resolving disputes and declaring law; the role of legislatures as
lawmakers; the role of judges in interpreting statutes and
constitutions; the role of administrative process in the making and

application of law; and the role of the legal profession.' However, the
book attempts innovation in two respects. First, it is not organized
around the legal process issues with, for example, one chapter on
statutory interpretation and another on the role of precedent. Instead,
it is organized chronologically around the development of a "social
issue": the abolition of slavery and the development of case and
statutory law banning segregation in schools and requiring equality of
educational opportunity. And second, although the authors say that
"any subject would serve [the legal process education] purpose of this
course," ' 7 clearly their choice of subject matter is viewed as crucial in
advancing the other purpose of these materials: "demonstrating to the
law student some of the ways in which the legal system can be made
an instrument for effectuating changes in society." s
Law, Lawyers, and Social Change is divided into four chapters.

The first deals with the abolition of dejure slavery in England and the
United States. The second, focusing on the segregation in public
schools remaining after the formal abolition of slavery, traces the
demise of dejure school segregation through the Brown v. Board of
Education decision.' The core of these chapters is approximately
sixteen appellate opinions, ten of which are from the Supreme Court
of the United States. In notes following the principal cases, the
authors attempt to raise many of the issues traditionally covered in a
legal process course. For example, the student is asked to consider the
proper method of statutory interpretation"0 and the function of the
4. Id.
5. The legal process issues were explored in the Hart and Sacks epic, The Legal Process:Basic
Problems in the Making and Application of Law (tent. ed. 1958), and the authors fully
acknowledge an intellectual debt.
6. HoRownTz & KARsT 2.
7. Id..at I.
8. Id.
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Primarily, the authors seek to show that the "plain meaning" approach, if taken to meaq
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canons of interpretation; the difference in a judge's role in
determining whether a prior case controls or whether a statute
"controls" the resolution of a controversy; and the significance of the
inherent differences between courts and legislatures for the proper role
of each institution. Perhaps because they fear that the chronological
organization of the materials may obscure the legal process issue they
seek to raise, the authors present, at the end of chapter two, an
"anticipatory epilogue" which serves as a cross reference to the'notes
and as a reminder to students of the significance of the preceding
material. For example, they ask "are the courts properly equipped to
acquire the factual information that may be essential to their
lawmaking role? (Recall the discussions of this question in connection
with cases like Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of
Education.)""
The final chapters trace the development of two areas of law since
Brown. Chapter three explores the various devices by which southern
states sought to avoid the result of Brown and the judicial and federal
legislative responses to these avoidance techniques. The chapter
includes cases dealing with pupil assignment plans, closure of the
public schools, tuition grants to private schools and individual
students, and background material on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The authors also include some material on the role of NAACP
lawyers in litigating these matters and raise questions about the
bearing of cause litigation on the traditional notions of the lawyerclient relationship. Chapter four contains material on de facto
segregation, including the power and the duty of state governments to
combat it, and on inequality in educational opportunity generally,
concluding with Hobson v. Hansen.1 2 Again, the notes discuss the
legal process issues raised by the cases and, in addition, elaborate on
13
many of the issues presented in the first half of the book.
that the role of the judge is merely to "find" the proper meaning of the statute or constitution
from a textual analysis alone, is inadequate. They make a plea instead for the "purposeoriented" approach. Unfortunately the differences in these two approaches are never fully
explored.
1I. HOROWITZ & KARST 235.
12. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.

Cir. 1967).
13. For example, early in chapter one the notes raise questions concerning statutory
interpretation, including the usefulness of the concept of the "intent of the framers" as a means
of interpretation. HOROWITZ & KARST 56-57. In chapter three the authors return to the subject
with a more detailed treatment of the problem, one which asks students to consider the relevance
of specific methods of determining legislative intent. Id. at 340-48.
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Since the authors acknowledge that any subject would serve as the
focus for the legal process issues they discuss, the chronological
organization of the book apparently reflects their conclusion that
legal process materials are more effective when organized around a
particular substantive law development.' 4 This conclusion is, I
suspect, grounded in a judgment that when legal process courses treat
process issues separately from the development of a specific problem
and legal response, students often fail to relate their legal process
learning to the problems raised in other courses. To authors of
traditionally organized legal process materials, this recognition
should indicate a change in approach. Either their texts should be used
in conjunction with a substantive course already taught" or their
material should be reorganized around a new body of doctrine.
Horowitz and Karst seem to have adopted the second alternative. 6
But they have a goal beyond more effectively educating law students
about the legal process. They aim to create a new course, one in the
legal process and social change through law. Given the loudly
articulated skepticism of many about the capability of the "system"
to effectuate meaningful change, the aim is timely and laudable.
Unfortunately, although the ideas behind the organization may
have merit, Law, Lawyers, and Social Change fails to achieve its

announced goals. The materials are not satisfying either as legal
process materials or as law and social change materials, possibly
because the two purposes the authors seek to further are incompatible
or because they have attempted a task too vast for a single law school
course. However, I think the book's failure is traceable to the
authors' limited view of what qualifies as adequate material for a
study of legal institutions, their choice of a substantive area in which
to demonstrate their social change points, and their overemphasis on
changes in legal rules, an emphasis which permits too easily the
inference that changes in legal rules are equivalent to changes in
society.
Several factors detract from the book's usefulness as a vehicle for
teaching traditional legal process materials. First, the cases are not
14. See id. at i. This is also the conclusion of the author of another new book on the legal
process, M. FRANKLIN, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN LAW (1968). "To give [the legal process]
analysis greater cohesion and relevance, we shall confront these problems in the context of a
single substantive legal area." Id. at v.
15. Gavit, Fuschs &Pauslen, supra note 2, suggest this as an alternative use of their book.
16. Another new text is organized around material more likely to be covered in a standard
curriculum. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 14.
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primarily about the issues the notes raise, and the reader is therefore
left without the benefit of the judge's views on the matters the notes
discuss. Of course, one useful means of studying the issues is to
examine cases which assume without discussion the proper method of,
for example, statutory or constitutional interpretation. However, it is
also important to read cases in which the proper method is enough at
issue to have provoked a response from the judge. 17 In Law, Lawyers,
and Social Change the student is generally left with the extrajudicial
statements of judges not involved in the principal cases."8 Second, the
notes provide too little textual material on the legal process issues to
demonstrate their complexity or to assist the student in resolving the
questions posed by the authors. The treatment of statutory
interpretation is a good example. The notes question the proper
method of statutory interpretation principally at three points in the
book,1 but the total treatment is superficial. While the authors ask
whether the "plain meaning" approach is useful, suggest the
"mischief rule" as an alternative, and question the helpfulness of
legislative history and the validity of seeking the "intent of the
framers," no readings are provided to amplify these difficult
questions. For instance, the works of H.L.A. Hart, 20 Lon Fuller,21 and
other important commentators 22 are not discussed, much less
excerpted. Even Frankfurter's views receive only citation treatment.?
The result is that the issue, spread through the book, is obscured and
underdeveloped.
The author's treatment of questions traditionally grouped under a
consideration of the judicial function similarly fails to present
sufficient material to enable students to deal with the issues in a
sophisticated manner. For example, in one note the authors ask the
student what justifies overruling a precedent. But the materials give
the student few readings which would be helpful in formulating an
17. See, e.g.. Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,62 (1936); Church of The Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
18. The authors do report Justice Black's later thoughts about an aspect of the second Brown
decision. HOROWrrz & KARST 396.
19. Id. at 58-59, 71-78, 339-50.
20. E.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW (1961); Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Morals,71 HARV. L. Rav. 593 (1958).
21. E.g., Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARv. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
22. See cases cited at note 17 supra.
23. HoRowrrz & KARST 341.
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answer to the question. Neither Llewellyn, 4 Frank,15 nor Dworkin 6 is
discussed, and Cardozo is given a few lines much earlier in the
materials. These writers all have important ideas about the role of
-precedent and the legitimate latitude a judge may exercise short of
overruling a prior case, ideas which ought to be considered in
evaluating the questions the authors pose.
A problem more fundamental than the exclusion of some
significant material by noted commentators is the book's almost
exclusive focus on legal writers. The authors propose to study legal
institutions but, with few exceptions, the materials involve only the
comments of lawyers and legal scholars about legal institutions. Such
a narrow view of relevant material in a modern book is distressing,
especially in a book which is also concerned with social change. One
need not agree with psychoanalytic explanations of history or with
radical interpretations of societal structures to acknowledge that such
views at least ought to be considered in a study of legal institutions.,,
Moreover, many traditionallegal process issues involve the functions
and limits of language, and the insights of "non-legal" writers
concerning these matters seem especially relevant to an understanding
of the "legal" problems.28
Horowitz and Karst chose slavery and segregation as the doctrinal
focus for their book because "during the professional lifetime of
today's law student

. . .

racial equality will be the The Theme that

dominates all others in our society." Some may dispute this
assessment. But even if the authors' judgment on the course of legal
debate in the next forty years is entirely correct, their choice of
substantive issue poses pedagogical problems for the study of the role
of law in social change. First, the choice of substantive issues
necessitates the inclusion of a substantial number of opinions of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Some of the most complicated
issues in American jurisprudence involve the jurisdictional doctrines
of the Supreme Court, especially those that involve the Court's
decision not to hear a particular case. These doctrines, evolved in
24.
25.
26.
27.

E.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH (195 1).

E.g., J.FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
E.g., R. Dworkin, JudicialDiscretion, 60 J.PHIL. 624 (1963).
See, e.g., N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH (1959); E. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM
(1941); H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1955).
28. See. e.g.. B. RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY (1912); A. WHITEHEAD, THE
FUNCTION OF REASON (1929); L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1958); cf.
Stone, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,5-9 (1968).
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varying degrees to protect the Court's independence, to further the
concept of federalism, and to insure efficient and well-informed
adjudication, are difficult enough when .studied in the context of
courses in constitutional law or federal courts. The authors determine
not to discuss any of these matters in depth, but unfortunately
discussion cannot be avoided altogether, and the general result is a
superficial treatment of complex issues.29 Therefore, the Supreme
Court decisions are presented without accompanying materials
concerning the unique institutional characteristics of the Court and
with little discussion of the peculiar problems faced by a federal
supreme court in a dual court system. To constitutional law teachers
the book will, I think, seem too thin; for legal process teachers it will
seem too complex, unless the teacher is willing to gloss over the
important subtitles or add supplementary materials.
Second, certainly the authors are correct in asserting that, at least
since 1954, segregation and discrimination have been central social
issues. But precisely because these issues have been so dramatically
discussed elsewhere and because the resolution of at least the problem
of de jure segregation now seems so clear, the materials lack the
tension that a book on social change ought to have. To best
understand the complexities of social change one needs to
recognize-indeed feel-the weight of the conflicting interests
involved. But for most of today's law students the question of dejure
segregation is a closed one. It is yery difficult to empathize with the
slave owner or with the legislature which tries to circumvent Supreme
Court rulings on school segregation, and the result, then, is that the
majority of the book concerns issues about which there seems little
room for strenuous argument in 1970.
To be sure, subtle discrimination remains and to those
discriminated against the issue is still vital. Moreover, "benevolent
quotas," de facto segregation, and busing are all issues of current
impact. In fact, the book is enlivened in the concluding pages when the
authors finally move from a discussion of dejure segregation devices
29. E.g., HOROWITZ & KARST 379-82 (discussion of advisory opinions). Even Professor
Wechsler's famous article, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw. 73 HARV. L. REv.
I (1959), is given an apologetic footnote:

A beginning law student may find the materials in this note to be very difficult. The
materials are included at this point in order to introduce-not resolve-some
fundamental questions about the judicial process, which questions will arise frequently in
other law courses, and are treated more fully in the courses in constitutional law.
HOROWITZ & KARST 206.
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to a treatment of the role of state government in combating the lasting
effects of the prior dejure condition. Here, too, the book expands to
include a wider range of materials. For example, in discussing the
duty of the states to counter the effects of segregation in housing
through their assignment of pupils to public schools, the authors
present some interesting material on the Pasadena, California, school
system, material containing more than cases and the rules they
announce. The book gives substantial background information which
illuminates the tension between the parties involved in the dispute over
neighborhood schools, busing, and de facto segregation. It also
includes reports of school board hearings and a history of political
maneuvering and school board elections. Unfortunately, there is not
enough of this sort of material in the book. The student is
overwhelmed with cases and legislative enactments, leaving him
primarily with the notion that social change results from change in
particular rules of law and consequently with little appreciation for
the complex dynamics of effective social progress.
In summary, this book generally pictures the lawyer rather
traditionally as the litigator and the legislator, one who looks to law
reviews and legal scholars to understand and evaluate the legal
process. This is disappointing because the beginning law student is left
with too narrow a view of his possible future role as a lawyer, both in
regard to his notion about relevant sources of scholarly evaluation of
the legal system and in regard to his idea about the lawyer's role in
social change.3e But criticism of the execution should not be taken for
criticism of the basic aim of Horowitz and Karst. Their aim is
laudable and, perhaps, achievable. Expansion of the legal process
notes, inclusion of fewer cases 31 and more social science material, and
less emphasis on the historical development of the demise of de jure
30. But these roles are in many instances merely follow-up procedures. When pertinent
litigation is successful or when social legislation passes, the events are more often evidence of
social change rather than the stimulus behind it. The function of lawyers as recorders of social
change is important, of course. But lawyers also have a causitive function, perhaps better Seen by
studying examples of lawyers counseling, negotiating, and exhorting clients and others.
31. Some currently included are fine teaching vehicles and would provide a sound foundation
for expanded notes. See United States v. Biloxi Municipal School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.
Miss. 1963); United States v. County School Board, 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963), Both
cases, dealing with the meaning of 20 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (1958), reach opposite conclusions,
although both district judges rely on the "plain meaning" of the statute. HoRowrrz & KARST
326-35, 338-39.
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segregation would produce an improved second edition, one which
might come closer to fulfilling the promise of the book's introduction.
Scott H. Bice*
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.S. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Southern California.

